MASAK Tebliğ 32
Also called MASAK Genel Tebliğ Sıra No 32, uzaktan kimlik tespiti, Turkish remote identity verification
Tebliğ 32 amends Türkiye's remote identity verification rules in two ways that change who must verify and how.
The two amendments
Crypto-asset service providers were added to the obliged parties under Article 5/A, which puts CASPs inside the remote-KYC regime rather than beside it. And banks, financial institutions and CASPs may now remotely identify foreign nationals, which was previously a gap: the standard Turkish path assumes the domestic identity infrastructure, and a foreign customer does not have it.
The requirement is unusually specific
For remote identification of a foreign national the regulation names the method: an ICAO 9303 compliant passport with an NFC chip, where the chip data is read and matched against the passport's printed details. A named international standard, a named technology and a named verification step, inside a Turkish AML regulation.
Why that specificity matters commercially
Regulations usually describe an outcome and leave the method open. This one describes the method. That removes the argument a vendor normally has to win, and replaces it with a question of whether the vendor's implementation does the named thing correctly.
Where the claim must stop
It covers foreign nationals, not the whole market, and reading the chip is not the same as having proven the reading against real documents. Both limits belong in any sentence that cites this regulation.
Where it comes from
Someone else specified this. Solidus assembles it.
Issued by MASAK, the Financial Crimes Investigation Board of the Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance, and published in the Resmî Gazete on 27 June 2026 as an amendment to Genel Tebliğ Sıra No 19, which governs remote identity verification by obliged parties under Türkiye's AML regime. Solidus wrote none of it and is not an obliged party under it.
How to check this
Solidus has not built this. The entry explains the concept.
The tebliğ is public in the Resmî Gazete of 27 June 2026. What Solidus can show against it is the ICAO 9303 reading path, with the limitation stated in that entry. No Turkish obliged party has used it, and no regulator has assessed it.