BTK SIM Registration (Turkey)
Ayrıca şöyle anılır BTK Kimlik Doğrulama Yönetmeliği, Turkish mobile subscriber identity verification, SIM kayıt zorunluluğu, mobile SIM KYC
Türkiye requires every mobile phone subscriber, whether signing up for a postpaid line or buying a prepaid SIM off a dealer's shelf, to have their identity verified before that SIM is activated. The regulator behind this is BTK, and the practical mechanism nearly every Turkish operator uses to satisfy it is a check against e-Devlet (see that entry), Türkiye's e-government identity system: the subscriber's declared identity is confirmed against the national population registry before the line goes live.
What the pain actually is, read this carefully, because it isn't "no verification exists." Every incumbent Turkish operator already runs a one-shot ID-scan-plus-e-Devlet check at signup; this rule is not a gap in the market. The friction is that this already-verified identity does not travel: it gets re-captured and re-typed at every dealer counter, every additional line a subscriber adds, and every corporate eSIM provisioning step, because a one-shot check performed at first signup doesn't carry forward across an operator's own channels. The paper or photocopied ID retained at the point of sale to support that one-shot check is itself a document-retention liability under KVKK, layered on top of the re-capture friction.
Who actually built this
BTK, Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, is Türkiye's telecom regulator, established under Law No. 5809. It writes the secondary regulations that turn the general statutory requirement into a specific, checkable identity-verification step operators must run before activating service. One visible example of an operator adapting to this rule: TürkNet, an independent ISP, moved from a courier-and-paper identity-confirmation process to a live e-Devlet digital identity check in November 2022, following BTK's identity-verification regulation. None of this, the law, the regulation, or any operator's implementation of it, is a Solidus design.
Solidus today
Solidus has not built or shipped a BTK-registration integration with any Turkish mobile operator. This is researched market opportunity, grounded in one sourced comparable (a 243,000-plus-subscriber MVNO's public numbers) and one warm accelerator relationship with an incumbent operator, not a live product with paying telecom customers. Nothing here should be read as implying Solidus Verify has replaced, or could unilaterally replace, an operator's own regulatory registration obligation.
See also
KYC is the general process BTK's rule is a specific, telecom-sector instance of. TCKN is the national identifier the identity check is actually run against. e-Devlet is the government system most operators check the subscriber's identity through. MASAK is the parallel Turkish regulator for financial-sector identity verification, run through a different statute for a different sector.
Nereden geliyor
Bunu başkası belirtti. Solidus bir araya getiriyor.
BTK, Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority, is Türkiye's telecom regulator, operating under Law No. 5809 (Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu, the Electronic Communications Law, 2008) and its own secondary regulations, including BTK's identity-verification rules governing e-Devlet-based remote subscriber identification. These require every mobile subscriber, prepaid and postpaid alike, to be identity-verified before a SIM is activated. Solidus did not draft any of this regulation.
Bunu nasıl doğrularsınız
Solidus bunu inşa etmedi. Girdi kavramı açıklıyor.
None yet. There is no live BTK-registration integration to demonstrate, and none is claimed. BTK's own regulatory framework is public at btk.gov.tr for anyone who wants to read the primary source rather than a vendor's summary of it.