EDD (Enhanced Due Diligence)
Also called Enhanced Due Diligence, enhanced KYC, high-risk customer due diligence
Enhanced Due Diligence is what Customer Due Diligence (see CDD) becomes when a risk assessment flags a particular customer or relationship as higher-risk than the baseline, it's the same four-part CDD obligation (identify, verify, understand, monitor), done with more scrutiny and more frequency, plus a handful of concrete steps standard CDD doesn't require at all.
A relationship typically gets routed into EDD for reasons like: the customer is a Politically Exposed Person (see PEP) or closely connected to one; the customer or the transaction touches a jurisdiction FATF or the relevant regulator has flagged as high-risk; the ownership or control structure behind the customer is unusually complex or opaque (see UBO); or a transaction is unusually large, unusually complex, or has no clear legitimate economic purpose given what's known about the customer.
Once a relationship is in EDD, the concrete measures typically added on top of standard CDD include: establishing source of wealth and source of funds (see that entry), not just what documents prove a specific deposit's origin, but where the customer's overall wealth came from; obtaining senior management approval before opening or continuing the relationship, rather than leaving the decision to a front-line analyst; and running more frequent, more intensive ongoing monitoring than a standard-risk account gets. The point of all of it is the same: a check calibrated to actual risk, not a fixed check applied regardless of how risky the relationship turns out to be.
Who actually built this
FATF Recommendation 10's interpretive note sets the general EDD requirement; Recommendation 12 adds the specific PEP trigger. The EU's Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (and its successor AMLR) names concrete EDD triggers, including a formal list of high-risk third countries EDD must apply to. Türkiye's MASAK carries the same obligation through its own risk-based-approach regulation. None of it is Solidus's design.
Solidus today
Solidus has not built any part of EDD. There is no risk-scoring engine to route a customer into EDD in the first place, no workflow to collect and substantiate source of wealth or source of funds, no senior-management-approval step, and no enhanced ongoing-monitoring capability. This is a deeper, unstarted gap than CDD itself, which at least has an identification input Solidus Verify supplies today, EDD has none.
See also
CDD is the baseline obligation EDD escalates from. PEP and Source of Wealth / Source of Funds are two of EDD's most concrete requirements. UBO, an unusually complex ownership structure, is one of the risk factors that triggers it. AML is the umbrella program EDD sits inside.
Where it comes from
Someone else specified this. Solidus assembles it.
EDD is required by FATF Recommendation 10's interpretive note and Recommendation 12 (Politically Exposed Persons) for customers and relationships a risk assessment flags as higher-risk. The EU's AMLD5 and the newer AMLR name specific EDD triggers, high-risk third countries, PEP relationships, unusually large or complex transactions with no clear economic purpose. Türkiye's MASAK layers its own risk-based-approach regulation on top. None of this is a Solidus design.
How to check this
Solidus has not built this. The entry explains the concept.
None. This entry states what has not been built, not what has.